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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-1705
____________
AGNES MANU,
Appellant,
v.
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF INDIANA, doing
business as NATIONAL CITY LOAN SERVICES,
INC.; NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION; FIRST
FRANKLIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, doing
business as FIRST FRANKLIN LOAN SERVICES;
RALPH ORSINI; HOME LOAN SERVICES, INC.
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-03611)
District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II
__________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 15, 2012
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES AND WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 20, 2012)
____________
OPINION
____________
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant Agnes Manu appeals the order of the District Court dismissing her
revised amended complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
Manu entered into a mortgage loan with First Franklin Financial Corporation in
December 2001. The mortgage secured the property located at 7000 Woodbine Avenue
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Eventually, the loan was assigned to National City Bank
of Indiana (“the Bank”). Manu defaulted on the mortgage by failing to make payments
after March 1, 2006. On June 22, 2006, the Bank filed a Complaint in Mortgage
Foreclosure in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Manu defended against
the mortgage foreclosure action by raising a number of Preliminary Objections under the
state rules of civil procedure, and, when those were unsuccessful, by seeking to amend
her answer to raise additional defenses. She also sought to stay the sale of her property.
Eventually, the state court granted summary judgment to the Bank.
On August 30, 2007, and prior to a sheriff’s sale, Manu initiated the instant civil
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Manu
alleged that the foreclosure was invalid for a number of reasons, and that the grant of
summary judgment in state court was the result of collusion and conspiracy between the
Bank and court employees of the Prothonotary’s Office.
Manu also appealed the state court foreclosure judgment to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, and sought to stay the sheriff’s sale. The Superior Court declined to stay
the sale, and the property was sold at sheriff’s sale on May 5, 2009. Manu continued
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with the appeal by filing a brief with the Superior Court. On August 21, 2009, the
Superior Court quashed the appeal. The court reasoned that Manu preserved no issues
for appeal because of defects in her original answer and because she did not respond in
opposition to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. The state supreme court denied
discretionary review on September 3, 2010. Manu later petitioned to set aside the
sheriff’s sale; the state trial court refused to set aside the sale.
In April 2009, Manu received permission from the District Court to file an
amended complaint in her federal action. She then filed a “revised amended complaint,”
naming National City Bank and First Franklin Financial Corporation, among others, as
defendants. In her amended complaint, Manu alleged a breach of contract, and violations
of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2605 et seq., the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, the Truth in Lending
Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, and Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices Act and
Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201-3. She also alleged that the
defendants discriminated against her on the basis of race, gender and nationality1 in
violation of various civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985(3), and 1986, and she included in her amended complaint fraud and conspiracy
counts, and counts for unjust enrichment and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In the main, Manu complained that she did not receive certain required notices, the Bank
sent false and inaccurate information about her to credit bureaus, and her qualified
written requests, see 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A), were improperly ignored. In ¶ 25 of her
1

Manu is from the nation of Ghana in Africa.
3

revised amended complaint, she blamed state court personnel for conspiring with the
defendants to enforce court procedural rules against her and cause her to lose the state
court action.2
In October 2010, the defendants moved to dismiss the revised amended complaint,
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1), (6), or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 56(a). They raised specific grounds for dismissal or summary judgment, including
that many counts failed to state a claim for relief or warranted summary judgment; that
the breach of contract, FDCPA, and state unfair trade practices counts were barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and res judicata, and that
certain other counts were barred by various statutes of limitation. Manu submitted a
written response in opposition to the defendants’ motion, arguing, among other things,
that she could not have brought her current claims as counterclaims in the state court
foreclosure action.
In an order entered on February 15, 2011, the District Court granted the
defendants’ motion and dismissed the revised amended complaint. The court concluded
that Rooker-Feldman barred the complaint in its entirety. In the margin, the court noted
that, in addition, many of Manu’s claims also were barred by statutes of limitation, Rule
12(b)(6), and res judicata. Manu appeals.
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During the course of the instant civil action, Manu’s husband, Steve Frempong, filed a
motion to intervene, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24(a)(2). The District Court denied the motion
because Frempong was not a party to the mortgage note. We affirmed in Manu v.
National City Bank of Indiana, 321 Fed. Appx. 173, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2009).
4

We will affirm. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) dismissals. See In re: Kaiser Group
International Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 560 (3d Cir. 2005) (Rule 12(b)(1)); Weston v.
Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001) (Rule 12(b)(6)). We “are free” to affirm
the judgment “on any basis which finds support in the record.” Bernitsky v. United
States, 620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1980).
Pursuant Rooker-Feldman, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to
engage in appellate review of state court determinations. See Turner v. Crawford Square
Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). Rooker-Feldman is confined to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basics
Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “[T]here are four requirements that must be
met for the Rooker–Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court;
(2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments; (3) those
judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting
the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Great Western Mining &
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks and brackets removed), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1798 (U.S. 2011).3 All four
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We note for the benefit of the parties that the phrase “inextricably intertwined,” which
played a significant role in our pre-Exxon Mobil application of the doctrine, “does not
create an additional legal test or expand the scope of Rooker–Feldman beyond challenges
to state-court judgments.” Great Western Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 166.
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requirements are met here with respect to Manu’s breach of contract count and it thus
was properly dismissed pursuant to Rooker-Feldman for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). Her allegations that various statutes and rights
were violated because the defendants threatened, and followed through with, foreclosure
when they had no right to do so is nothing more than an attack on the state court
judgment. These allegations were properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
In all other respects, res judicata bars consideration of any issues that could have
been raised in the foreclosure action or Manu’s petition to set aside the sheriff’s sale.
“When a prior case has been adjudicated in a state court, federal courts are required by 28
U.S.C. § 1738 to give full faith and credit to the state judgment;” and, in doing so, a
federal court applies “the same preclusion rules as would the courts of that state."
Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted). Under Pennsylvania law, “[a]ny final, valid judgment on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties or their privies on
the same cause of action. Res judicata applies not only to claims actually litigated, but
also to claims which could have been litigated during the first proceeding if they were
part of the same cause of action.” Balent v. City of Wilkes–Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 313
(Pa. 1995). Here, the Court of Common Pleas ruled on notice and servicing issues, and
allegations regarding the timing of the assignment of the mortgage. Manu filed numerous
motions and raised a host of issues in challenging the foreclosure, and, even after
judgment was entered against her, she raised the same arguments again in a petition to set
6

aside the sheriff’s sale. Any claim that was, or could have been, litigated in state court is
barred by res judicata and subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
It is true, as Manu argues in her brief on appeal, that the assertion of counterclaims
is narrow under Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1148, see Green Tree Consumer Discount Co. v.
Newton, 909 A.2d 811, 815-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (action in mortgage foreclosure is
strictly an in rem proceeding and therefore a counterclaim for a set-off under TILA can
only be asserted in an action which contemplates a personal judgment); Mellon Bank,
N.A. v. Joseph, 406 A.2d 1055, 1060 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (claims that arose once the
mortgage was in default, and were not part of, or incident to, the creation of the mortgage
itself, could not be pled as counterclaims). Under Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1148, Manu could
only raise a counterclaim that went to the existence or validity of the mortgage. See
Chrysler First Business Credit Corp. v. Gourniak, 601 A.2d 338, 341 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992).
But even if Manu could not have technically pled her claims as counterclaims,
Rooker-Feldman and res judicata would still bar them where she could and did assert
those claims as defenses. The allegations Manu raised in her revised amended complaint
concerning improper fees and accounting, lack of notice, false credit reporting, and being
treated differently because of her race, were raised as defenses in the state foreclosure
action in her Preliminary Objections, motion to amend her answer, petition to set aside
the sheriff’s sale, and brief on appeal to the Superior Court; and they could also have
been raised in a response in opposition to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment had
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she submitted one.4 Asserting different theories of recovery in a second lawsuit will not
defeat the application of res judicata where the events underlying the two actions are
essentially similar. See U.S. v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983-84 (3d Cir.
1984).
To the extent that Rooker-Feldman and res judicata do not bar every single one of
the many counts in Manu’s revised amended complaint, we agree with the District Court
that there was no basis for this action to proceed. Manu’s RESPA claim under 12 U.S.C.
§ 2605(e)(1)(A), which requires that the servicer of a federally regulated loan respond in
a timely manner to a “qualified written request” from the borrower, must have been
brought within three years of when her cause of action accrued, see id. at § 2614. Manu’s
federal action was initiated on August 30, 2007, and thus any claim that accrued prior to
August 30, 2004 is time-barred. To the extent that Manu made qualified written requests
after August 30, 2004, and it appears that she did, the defendants are entitled to summary
judgment, because they established, and Manu did not rebut, that appropriate responses
were made right up until the time when the foreclosure action was filed. See Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, at Exhibit “E.”
Summary judgment is proper where there is an insufficient evidentiary basis on which a
reasonable jury could find in the non-movant’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
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Contrary to Manu’s assertions, the state courts did not violate her First Amendment
right of access to the courts by enforcing their procedural rules.
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Manu’s RESPA claims under section 2607 concerning fee splitting should have
been brought within one year of when the cause of action accrued, 12 U.S.C. § 2614.
The loan settled on December 22, 2001, and the note was modified on June 1, 2003. The
lawsuit was not initiated until August 30, 2007, more than four years later. Manu’s TILA
count similarly is barred by a one-year statute of limitation, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), and a
one-year statute of limitation also applies to Manu’s FDCPA count, 15 U.S.C. §
1692k(d). The RESPA count concerning lack of notice when the servicing of the loan
was transferred fails because the assignment of the mortgage transferred ownership of the
mortgage; the servicing of the mortgage was not transferred. Manu also failed to
establish that the statute explicitly created a private cause of action for the remainder of
her RESPA counts.
Last, a motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009). Manu’s civil rights, statutory and common law fraud, conspiracy,
unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress counts and theories of
recovery all fail the plausibility test. Her allegations supporting these counts are vague
and conclusory and wholly insufficient to support a cause of action.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing
the revised amended complaint with prejudice. Insofar as the extension appellant
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originally requested to file her reply brief was granted in full, her second motion for an
extension to file a reply brief is denied.
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